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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05THEHAGUE2555	2005-09-20 16:04	2011-01-19 20:08	SECRET	Embassy The Hague

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 002555

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/PRA, ISN/ECNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015
TAGS: MARR NL PREL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: UAV SALES TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 172807
¶B. STATE 164496

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer;
reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Polmiloff delivered ref A points to Ceta Noland
(Senior Policy Advisor, Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation
Division, MFA) September 20. Noland appreciated the new
information, and stated she would pass it on to the Dutch
intelligence service and the Financial and Economic
Investigation Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Noland
explained that the Dutch intelligence services typically pass
information on such cases directly to their U.S. intelligence
counterparts. She added that Dutch intelligence was actively
working the case; given Washington's keen interest, she said
she would try to pass us any update she receives.

¶2. (C) Noland could not/not confirm whether the shipment (ref
A) had been sent to Iran, although she suspected it had, or
she would have heard about a seizure at Schiphol Airport.
She noted that she would follow up with the Financial and
Economic Investigation Agency for a definite answer.

¶3. (C) Noland further explained that the Dutch intelligence
service is somewhat limited in investigations of companies.
For example, company cooperation is voluntary should the
Dutch intelligence agency request additional information
during an investigation. The Dutch government is considering
an audit of the company involved (ref B) by the Financial and
Economic Investigation Agency in which company cooperation
would become obligatory.
BLAKEMAN

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Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2555, NETHERLANDS: UAV SALES TO IRAN