This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 002664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR UNDERSECRETARY SHINER AND ASSISTANT USTR VARGO FROM 
AMBASSADOR LANGDALE 
ALSO WHA/CEN 
E ALSO FOR DEDWARDS 
EB FOR WCRAFT 
WHA/EPSC FOR KURS 
STATE PASS TO USTR ALSO FOR AMALITO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECIN PGOV PREL CS
SUBJECT: JAN. 1, 2006 ENTRY INTO FORCE HELPS CAFTA-DR IN 
COSTA RICA 
 
REF: SECSTATE 188288 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  We know that USTR must make a 
determination soon so that it can recommend to the President 
when he should issue his proclamation bringing CAFTA-DR into 
force.  Recognizing that this determination is of greater 
importance for countries that have already ratified, we want 
to highlight some less obvious consequences for Costa Rica. 
We believe that entry into force on January 1, 2006, rather 
than a later date, would help focus the GOCR,s eye on the 
prize and advance U.S. interests in Costa Rica. 
 
TIMING 
------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) We are aware that a decision will be made shortly 
in Washington on when to recommend to the President that the 
U.S. bring the U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) into force.  Consistent with 
public commentary by senior Administration officials over the 
past months, we have characterized January 1, 2006 as the 
target date for entry into force of CAFTA-DR.  Costa Rican 
Vice Minister for Foreign Trade (COMEX), Doris Osterlof, told 
Econoff last week that she was under the impression from her 
team in Washington that the entry-into-force date might slip. 
 While that may be wishful thinking on her part, slippage in 
that date would have real consequences for the ratification 
process in Costa Rica.  We understand that not all of the 
countries that have ratified CAFTA-DR have implemented all of 
their obligations under the agreement. 
 
SLIPPAGE HURTS CAFTA-DR IN COSTA RICA 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Any slippage in the date of entry into force would 
likely be seen here as a vindication of President Pacheco,s 
go slow policy and could dash any hope of his actively 
pushing CAFTA-DR before he leaves office on May 8, 2006. 
Indeed, we believe that Pacheco would spin a delay as 
evidence that the U.S. will not proceed on the implementation 
of CAFTA-DR without Costa Rica 
 
SLIPPAGE COULD AFFECT ELECTIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In addition, a later entry-into-force date could 
hurt those candidates in the February 5, 2006 presidential 
and legislative elections here who have been arguing that 
legislating CAFTA-DR is an urgent necessity.  Conversely, if 
CAFTA-DR were to come into force on January 1, 2006, whether 
with all of the countries that have ratified the agreement or 
a subset thereof, the pro-CAFTA-DR forces in Costa Rica would 
be strengthened.  An on-target entry into force would 
demonstrate clearly that Costa Rica is being left behind.  If 
one or more other countries are not there on Day One, this 
would highlight the need for full compliance with CAFTA-DR 
obligations and thereby underline the importance of Costa 
Rica,s moving forward on its complementary implementing 
legislation, such as telecommunications reform. 
 
Conclusion 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) For these reasons post believes that bringing the 
agreement into force on January 1, 2006 would advance U.S. 
interests in Costa Rica by indirectly keeping up the pressure 
on the GOCR to move CAFTA-DR forward expeditiously. 
LANGDALE