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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA5526, REPORT ON ARMS SURRENDERED BY THE PARAMILITARIES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA5526 | 2006-06-20 15:03 | 2011-03-09 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #5526/01 1711534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201534Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6169
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6911
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7855
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN LIMA 3926
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9275
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4576
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3593
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005526
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: REPORT ON ARMS SURRENDERED BY THE PARAMILITARIES
Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
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Summary
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¶1. (C) The ratio of weapons turned in per demobilized
paramilitary could be as high as one-to-one, according to
MAPP/OAS and GOC experts, if half the demobilizing
paramilitaries were not combat troops. However, experts
remain concerned about diversion of paramilitary weapons to
criminals. End summary.
-------------------------------------------
1 to 1 Ratio of People to Arms...or 2 to 1?
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia
(MAPP/OAS) analysts told poloff it was possible that only
15,000 of the 30,000 demobilized were part of the armed wing
of the AUC (the others part of the support network, such as
cooks and drivers). In that scenario, the ratio of the
15,000 weapons handed over per paramilitary would be close to
one-to-one. Even if all 30,000 demobilized were military
personnel (which is unlikely), the ratio of weapons turned in
per paramilitary would be closer to two-to-one, about average
for peace processes in other countries.
¶3. (C) Nevertheless, MAPP/OAS analysts expressed concern
with regard to specific AUC blocs that appear to have kept a
large portion of their weapons. For example, the North Bloc
had a person-to-weapons ratio of 3:1 (4,760 former combatants
demobilized and only 1,458 arms surrendered). Other blocs
with similar statistics included AutodefensasCampesinas de
Puerto Boyaca and Central Bolivar Bloc of south Bolivar, for
whom the ratio was 4:1.
¶4. (C) Analysts from the the GOC's Antiterrorist Analysis
Interinstitutional Group (GIAT)--responsible for receiving
the arms turned over by paramilitaries and for registering
the weapons--estimated that over 4,000 weapons were not
turned in. They explained their estimate is based on tracing
back to detected shipments of weapons that entered the
country illegally. For example, in 2003, a Bulgarian company
(ARSENAL SA) sold the AUC 7,640 AK-47 rifles; of these the
AUC has only handed over 2,333.
-----------------------
Paramilitary Structures
-----------------------
¶5. (C) GIAT analysts argued that paramilitary economic and
political structures remain active. They said structures
could regroup if the GOC failed to provide security in key
regions. According to military intelligence, five caches of
rifles have been detected in the Departments of Cordoba (2),
Bolivar (2), and Casanare (1). GIAT analysts said some of
the weapons found in these caches were being sold to
narcotraffickers in northern Valle del Cauca Department.
--------------------------------
Tracing Origins and Destinations
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) GIAT analysts explained that between November 2004
and April 2006, paramilitaries turned over 9,521 rifles and
195 machine guns (the balance of the 15,000 weapons were
handed over outside this period). Of these, 1,877 were made
in the United States and brought into Colombia by trafficking
rings. Most of the rifles were made in the former Soviet
Union (3,547), Bulgaria (2,333), North Korea (1,764), and
Poland (47). The machine guns were made in Romania (75),
Russia (60), Germany (37), Colombia (20), and Venezuela (3).
The majority of the weapons originated from Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Honduras, acquired legally during Central
America's internal conflicts in the 1980s and later were sent
illegally to Colombia via air and sea. (A more detailed
breakdown of the origins has been sent to WHA/AND.) GIAT
analysts noted arms confiscations had increased periodically
during 2002, 2003, and 2004; however, since the paramilitary
demobilization and exploratory talks between the GOC and ELN,
this number has decreased in the last two years.
---------------------
Venezuela Connections
---------------------
¶6. (C) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF) works closely with GIAT to assist the GOC to
trace weapons. In ATF's records, the 30,944 demobilized
paramilitaries have handed over 17,540 weapons, most of which
were in good condition. Very few serial numbers were erased
compared to previous illegal armed groups demobilizations.
Some of the weapons and magazines were made in Colombia.
Surprisingly, some rifles had the Venezuelan Armed Forces
shield inscribed on them, which suggests that not only the
FARC benefits from Venezuelan arms trafficking. Moreover,
some GLOCK pistols handed over by the paramilitaries can be
traced to a Venezuelan company called CAVIM. Other materials
of Venezuelan origin are rifle grenades model M60P1 that were
fabricated in the former Yugoslavia. ATF and other U.S.
government agencies are investigating the parties who sold
brokered sales from U.S. manufacturors, Vulcan House and
Krincks, to the paramilitaries.
WOOD