Currently released so far... 5420 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO810, IMPROVING POLL NUMBERS BUOY OPTIMISM OF ALCKMIN'S CAMPAIGN COORDINATOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO810.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO810 | 2006-07-28 16:04 | 2011-03-05 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO4353
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0810/01 2091636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281636Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5472
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6546
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2690
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2365
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2086
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1811
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2926
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7311
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3053
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2519
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000810
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
NSC FOR FEARS
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID/W FOR LAC/AA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EAGR BR
SUBJECT: IMPROVING POLL NUMBERS BUOY OPTIMISM OF ALCKMIN'S CAMPAIGN COORDINATOR
REF: (A) BRASILIA 1441;
(B) SAO PAULO 734;
(C) SAO PAULO 647 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (SBU) Opposition presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin's campaign coordinator told Consul General that the campaign is coming together well and that support for Alckmin is growing, as reflected in recent polls. Joao Carlos Meirelles said that critical alliances at the state level are firming up. The campaign will publish its comprehensive platform and government program on August 9 and then flood the airwaves when the period of free radio and television advertising begins August 15. Meirelles acknowledged that social programs like "Bolsa Familia" give President Lula an advantage among lower-class voters but believes Lula also has significant vulnerabilities, notably among farmers hurt by the Lula administration's agricultural policies. The election, he said, will go to a second round, in which "voters don't choose a person, they reject a person," and Lula's high negatives will doom him. This optimistic scenario is only to be expected from Meirelles, who was talking positively even back at the beginning of June (ref C), when Lula's lead in the polls exceeded 25 points, but he is likely correct in predicting that Alckmin will narrow the gap between now and the October 1 first-round balloting, and that the second round opens up new possibilities. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) Consul General (CG) and Poloff met July 27 with Joao Carlos de Souza Meirelles, overall campaign coordinator for opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin (see ref C). Meirelles said the campaign was going very well and repeated some of his observations from our previous meeting with him. The polls, he reiterated, are merely exercises in name recognition, and Lula's name is universally known in Brazil, especially because of the constant media exposure he has received in recent months. In that context, the improvement in Alckmin's numbers -- in early June, polls showed him trailing by 25-30 points; now it's closer to 15 -- is surprising and encouraging. Meirelles estimated that perhaps 40 percent of the population nationwide now knows who Alckmin is, with much work remaining to be done in the northeastern and the center-west regions.
--------- ALLIANCES ---------
¶3. (SBU) Meirelles described the consolidation of alliances at the state level, which he said will be key to electoral success. Alckmin's Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB) is allied with the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the smaller Popular Socialist Party (PPS). The alliance is particularly strong in the densely populated south and much of the southeast. In some states - he mentioned Santa Catarina as an example - they have an ad hoc alliance with the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Meirelles acknowledged problems in certain states, notably Maranhao in the northeast and Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, he contrasted the alliance's strength with Lula's coalition, which in addition to Lula's Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) includes only the Communists and the small Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) of Vice President Alencar. The PT was not even able to bring its traditional Socialist allies on board. While Lula himself is broadly popular, Meirelles said, his own party is not particularly strong even in the northeast ("only one governorship, in Piaui, and they might not hold that"), and his alliance is not likely to be
SAO PAULO 00000810 002 OF 003
able to deliver votes, especially with his own party's image so badly tarnished by scandal.
¶4. (SBU) On or about August 9, the campaign will publish its comprehensive platform and governing program, covering some thirteen areas (e.g., health, education, macroeconomy, telecommunications, foreign policy). Thirteen working groups have been developing the program for months; since late June, when the alliance was formalized, PFL and PPS representatives have been participating in the working groups as well. Alckmin delivered an abbreviated version of the government program in his June 11 speech accepting the PSDB nomination (ref B), but the platform will describe in detail how his government will achieve its objectives. Many elements of the program will be featured in the free radio and television advertising spots that begin August 15 and run through the rest of the campaign. It is also safe to assume, Meirelles said, that these spots will target corruption in the Lula administration (the "mensalao" scandal) as well as what he characterized as incompetence and "immobilism."
--------------- SOCIAL PROGRAMS ---------------
¶5. (SBU) CG asked how the Alckmin campaign planned to counteract Lula's advantage in the northeast generated in large part by social programs, especially "Bolsa Familia." This government stipend program now reaches more than eleven million poor families, many of them in the impoverished northeast; numerous pollsters and political analysts have asserted that Lula can count on the votes of Bolsa Familia recipients, as well as those who have benefited from the sharp increase in the minimum wage. Meirelles noted that Bolsa Familia was a PSDB program, begun during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), which the PSDB still supports. He expressed the view that the population that benefits from the program is volatile in its voting habits and will not base its vote solely on its receiving a handout from the federal government. He noted further that on August 4, the Alckmin campaign has planned an event in Recife unveiling a program for a new northeast, highlighting its plans for investment in the region. Finally, he stressed the key role of municipalities, especially Mayors, in administering the Bolsa Familia program, and suggested that local alliances may prove more important than the federal government's role in determining voter preferences. Ultimately, he acknowledged, Lula would likely defeat Alckmin in the northeast, but not by nearly as wide a margin as polls currently suggest, while Alckmin held a large advantage in the south and southeast. Alckmin not only still enjoys strong popularity in the most populous state, Sao Paulo, but will benefit from a strong gubernatorial candidate in Jose Serra. Likewise, in the second most populous state, Minas Gerais, he will benefit from the coattails of PSDB leader Aecio Neves, who appears a shoo-in for re-election AS Governor. Alckmin would likely run well in the rural Center-West as well, he said, where "policy errors committed by the Lula administration" had led to an agricultural crisis. On the other hand, Meirelles acknowledged problems in the populous state of Rio de Janeiro which would need to be addressed in order to boost Alckmin's votes there.
------------------------------- LULA'S POSSIBLE VULNERABILITIES -------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Asked about the impact on the campaign of third-party candidate Heloisa Helena (who got about ten percent in recent polls), Meirelles said it was good for Alckmin. A leftist who had been expelled from the PT, she would take some votes away from Lula and would gain other votes that otherwise would have been null or
SAO PAULO 00000810 003 OF 003
blank. CG asked also about the role of Lula's former Chief of Staff, Jose Dirceu, who recently met with the Landless Movement (MST). Meirelles said that having an individual like Dirceu, who had resigned from government in disgrace and then been expelled from Congress and deprived of his political rights, representing the ruling party in these core social movements, created a very bad image. He also claimed that at the recent Mercosul Summit in Cordoba, Argentina, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez had expressed support for Lula's re-election. This, he said, was like Chavez's support for Humala in Peru and Lopez Obrador in Mexico, something that was likely to boomerang on Lula, and certainly something the opposition was going to take advantage of at the opportune moment.
¶7. (SBU) The bottom line for Meirelles was that Lula will win the first round, though not by an exceedingly wide margin. In the October 29 runoff, he said, Alckmin will have the advantage, because "in the second round, you don't choose a person, you reject a person," and Lula is known to have high negative numbers.
¶8. (SBU) Asked if former President Cardoso (FHC) would be campaigning for Alckmin, Meirelles said that had not yet been decided. The Lula campaign was trying to portray the Alckmin campaign as a throwback to the FHC years, and the candidate and strategists wanted to wait to see whether it looked like FHC would be more an asset than a liability.
------- COMMENT -------
¶9. (SBU) For Meirelles to talk optimistically is to be expected; nevertheless, much of what he says makes sense. Lula, who does indeed have high rejection numbers, may well have hit his ceiling, and Alckmin is certainly moving up, though he still has a long way to go. The Alckmin campaign does appear to be running much better than it was a month ago, and although Lula remains popular, he does have vulnerabilities. Assuming the election does go to a second round, as appears likely, Lula may still be the favorite, but his victory would by no means be a sure thing. END COMMENT.
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
MCMULLEN