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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0783/01 1071041
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P 161041Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8946
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000783 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR PASCUAL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM EG
SUBJECT: MAHALLA RIOTS: ISOLATED INCIDENT OR TIP OF AN 
ICEBERG? 

REF: A. CAIRO 621 
¶B. CAIRO 697 
¶C. CAIRO 715 
¶D. CAIRO 724 
¶E. CAIRO 730 

Classified By: DCM Stuart E. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (C) Summary: Egyptians are uneasy about the April 6 and 7 
anti-government riots in Mahalla, which featured thousands of 
unemployed youth battling riot police in the streets of the 
Nile Delta mill-town (refs B-D). The violent demonstrations 
followed on an opposition-organized general strike on April 
6, which noticeably quieted Cairo's busy streets, as many 
Egyptians stayed home, many out of fear of potential public 
disorder, and some in solidarity with the strike (ref B). 
The Mahalla riots have both reflected and fed into resentment 
about spiraling food prices and widespread anger at the 
government. Egyptians are in a sour mood, and their 
frustration seems more vocal than just a few months ago. The 
government is paying close attention, and is now focused on 
heading off a follow-on national strike called for May 4, 
Mubarak's eightieth birthday. End summary. 

-------------------- 
HEROES OR HOOLIGANS? 
-------------------- 

¶2. (C) Reaction to the Mahalla clashes seems divided along 
class lines. The lower-income Egyptians we spoke with 
expressed enthusiasm about the riots, with two independently 
telling us they were "ecstatic" at the news. Many said, "the 
government deserved it." They all attributed the riots to 
sharply increased food prices. Year-on-year inflation in 
March reached 14.4 percent; food-only inflation for March 
reached 22 percent. Many Egyptians acknowledge that the 
fundamental unspoken Egyptians social pact -- the peoples' 
obeisance in exchange for a modest but government-guaranteed 
standard of living -- is under stress, and the poor feel this 
most acutely. One worker remarked: "it is the people's 
right (to strike), if their government lies to them, tells 
them that food prices are stable, but then we go try to buy 
oil or bread, and cannot afford it." A cab driver told us, 
"God willing, such riots will occur in Cairo soon; the only 
thing stopping us is fear." 

¶3. (C) Elites appear anxious. On April 6, many parents of 
private school children kept their children home. The 
private German School was reportedly half empty. Referring 
to Mahalla, a textile factory owner told us, "The poor are 
desperate, and this is a natural result of that. We may see 
more riots, and we will definitely see more crime in Cairo; 
it is already happening; the poor have to resort to 
stealing." Meanwhile, Cairo's limited middle class seems 
stuck in between - a reflexive fear of chaos feeds their 
worries of riots, but seems nearly equaled by their 
admiration of the Mahalla protesters for "giving the 
government what it deserves," as one shop-owner told us. 

------------------------------- 
IS THIS THE START OF SOMETHING? 
------------------------------- 

¶4. (C) The key question is, will the localized incident in 
Mahalla spark a wider movement? The government is clearly 
focused on containing unrest. Even while the riots were 
still winding down, PM Nazif traveled to Mahalla, paid 
bonuses to factory workers and praised those who did not join 
in the riots (ref D). The government has also accelerated 
arrests of activists in Cairo (ref E). The organizers of the 
April 6 strike -- distinct from Mahalla -- have already 
called, via Facebook, for a follow-on national strike on May 
4, Mubarak's eightieth birthday. Even regime insiders have 
acknowledged the political savvy behind this tactic -- 
channeling current outrage towards the next big event. The 
GOE responded with a press release announcing that President 
Mubarak will give a May 5 speech to "underline Egypt's keen 
to desire to protect the rights of laborers and accentuate 
the role they can play in the development process .... and to 
reiterate the government's commitment to safeguard the 
interests of workers against any backlashes they might face 
as a result of the economic reform program." More broadly, 
the government continues to address the shortage of 
subsidized bread by using military bakeries and distribution 
centers, and bread lines in Cairo seem to have diminished. 

¶5. (C) The government's concern is driven by recent events, 
but likely also by worried looks in the rear-view mirror. 
Egyptians are renowned for their apathy in the face of trying 

CAIRO 00000783 002 OF 002 


conditions. Nevertheless, 1952's "Black Saturday," when many 
foreign-affiliated establishments in Cairo were burned to the 
ground; the January 1977 bread riots, when tens of thousands 
of Egyptians took to the streets nationwide in 
anti-government riots precipitated by the government's 
planned cancellation of food subsidies; and the February 1986 
riots of the Central Security Forces, protesting a rumored 
extension of their term of service, resulting in hundreds of 
deaths nationwide, and USD millions in damage, all 
demonstrate that even supposedly quiescent Egyptians have 
their limits. 

¶6. (C) While there are currently no angry demonstrators on 
the streets of Cairo, the situation is more tense than even a 
few months ago. Widespread bitterness about spiraling 
prices, seething upset about government corruption, disdain 
for the Mubarak government's perceived pro-US and Israel 
posture, and working class economic woes (ref A) bubble up in 
virtually every conversation. It is not clear how the next 
catalyst for action -- if there is one -- might materialize. 
Neither the Mahalla rioters nor the April 6 group have 
charismatic, clearly identified leadership. It is 
significant that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), now suffering 
under the arrests of thousands of arrests of its members, 
distanced itself from both of "movements." Egypt's 
omnipresent security apparatus is also a strong 
counter-balance to riots and demonstrations. We think it is 
possible that Egypt will witness further spasms of limited 
violence, but these are likely to be isolated and 
uncoordinated, rather than revolutionary in nature. 

¶7. (C) Although not on the scale of the 1977 or 1986 riots, 
Mahalla is significant. The violent protests demonstrated 
that it is possible to tear down a poster of Mubarak and 
stomp on it, to shout obscene anti-regime slogans, to burn a 
minibus and hurl rocks at riot police. These are unfamiliar 
images that lower-income Egyptians thrill to. In Mahalla, a 
new organic opposition force bubbled to the surface, defying 
current political labels, and apparently not affiliated with 
the MB. This may require the government to change its 
script. 

¶8. (C) April 6 brought together disparate opposition forces 
together with numerous non-activist Egyptians, with the 
Facebook calls for a strike attracting 70,000 people on-line, 
and garnering widespread national attention. The nexus of 
the upper and middle-class Facebook users, and their poorer 
counterparts in the factories of Mahalla, created a new 
dynamic. One senior insider mused, "Who could have imagined 
that a few kids on the internet could foment a buzz that the 
entire country noticed? I wish we could do that in the 
National Democratic Party." 

¶9. (C) Another result of Mahalla is that Mubarak will even 
more strongly resist both economic and political reform 
initiatives. Six months ago, economic cabinet ministers 
openly discussed phasing out food and fuel subsidies in favor 
of transfer payments to the very poor. That initiative now 
seems to be off the table. We are also hearing that unrest 
over prices has strengthened the security ministers in the 
cabinet in resisting privatization and other efforts towards 
liberalization. The riots introduce a new dynamic for us as 
well. Under these stressful conditions, Mubarak and his 
regime will be even more sensitive to US criticism over human 
rights abuses and democracy shortfalls. On April 15, Foreign 
Minister Aboul Gheit, meeting with the Ambassador, cited the 
Mahalla incident as a strain and added that he hoped that the 
United States would be supportive of Egypt during this 
difficult period. 
RICCIARDONE