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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09LAPAZ96, BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS 
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin | 
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09LAPAZ96 | 2009-01-23 13:01 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz | 
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLP #0096/01 0231326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231326Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8742
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6115
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0078
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7298
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4344
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0330
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6085
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6963
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1731
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS 
REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606 
¶B. LA PAZ 6 
¶C. LA PAZ 11 
¶D. LA PAZ 62 
¶E. LA PAZ 90 
Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
¶1. (C) Summary:  With the January 25 constitutional 
referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory 
for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward 
Socialism (MAS) party.  Although the opposition has made 
inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to 
between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed 
constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent), 
and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural 
base to victory.  After a series of national news articles 
raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008 
recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken 
pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure.  However, a 
recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the 
court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant 
electoral fraud is likely.  While cheating seems unnecessary 
to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give 
the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding 
legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional 
clauses.  Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will 
use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and 
institute rule by decree.  At both the national and regional 
levels, the margin of victory matters.  A landslide for the 
MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the 
eastern departments, could spark more conflict.  End summary. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MAS Victory Seems Assured 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly 
approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales 
and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party. 
Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead, 
causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls 
point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed 
constitution.  (One government poll shows the "yes" vote 
winning by 66 percent.)  However, many polls downplay or 
ignore the MAS' rural base.  Almost as importantly, the MAS 
seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments, 
including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with 
Beni a distinct possibility.  If the MAS can win at levels 
similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67 
percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna" 
or eastern half of the country, they will have much more 
leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over 
implementing legislation. 
- - - - - - 
Polling Data 
- - - - - - 
¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two 
weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling 
methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural).  Recent national polls 
by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for 
the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected, 
ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent, 
respectively.  Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital 
cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos 
showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40 
percent.  However, our contacts tell us all these polls 
partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS 
has much of its base.  A poll by Observatorio de Gestion 
Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria 
Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus 
31 percent against.  Some estimate a six percent "bump" when 
the rural vote is included. 
¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown 
by city or region indicate 
the constitution will easily win in at least four 
departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely 
with at least 70 percent support in each.  The MAS has a 
distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well.  In 
Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split 
evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija 
supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36.  Polling 
data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its 
capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution, 
by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is 
leaning for approval of the constitution.  The Observatorio 
poll shows Beni evenly split as a department. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rural and Indigenous Role 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort 
across the country to rally against the constitution, the 
forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them, 
particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base 
in the Altiplano.  Leading daily La Razon interviewed several 
community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters, 
and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the 
supporters had read the Constitution.  Instead, the repeated 
message was that rural communities would take their marching 
orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According 
to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of 
respondents said they had read much or all of the 
constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read 
some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft 
text.  In the countryside, the number of those reading the 
constitution is much lower.  Post suspects disinterest, blind 
faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy, 
despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role.  In 
addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution 
probably scares some potential readership away. 
¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance 
among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does 
exist, albeit for a variety of reasons.  The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally 
support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel 
A).  In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS 
had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales 
was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous 
issues.  Although they held a national meeting on January 17 
and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated 
when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of 
funding and pressure on local social and business leaders, 
held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be 
difficult to break.  They also noted rural communities tended 
to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they 
discarded it to vote en masse for another. 
¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural 
social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor 
Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz 
also publicly recommended voting against it because it was 
seen as not revolutionary enough.  They criticized the 
government for making too many concessions to the opposition 
during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21, 
including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive. 
However, they have a relatively small following, and some, 
like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected 
MAS margin of victory shrunk in January.  Edgar Patana, 
leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto 
union leaders, and the majority of social groups have 
recommended voting for the constitution. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Opposition Feisty, But Realistic 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be 
battling 
more to limit the margin of defeat than to win.  In 
Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx
told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the 
"No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the 
opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine 
departments (Reftel E).  Although a current 
privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the 
constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34 
percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate 
xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to 
win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic 
scenario.  He predicted that Morales would succeed in 
personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and 
leverage his cult of personality.  Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more 
concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and 
discrediting the results of "any election that uses this 
voter roll" (Reftel C). 
¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been 
criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but 
also building a foundation for a likely run for the 
presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside 
jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential 
candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack 
the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors) 
who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are 
not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and 
galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three 
presidential contenders to show opposition unity and 
xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE 
and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they 
exclusively represent the indigenous.8  xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that 
opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately 
muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with 
the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy.  "Political 
parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx La 
Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on 
issues and distance themselves from the party moniker.  "We 
need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the 
old leaders.  This will take time." 
¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told 
PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum 
lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in 
resources by de-personalizing the constitution and 
"convincing people on the street that is not in their best 
interests."  Although he conceded the "no" campaign would 
ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud 
between Morales and Church, corruption charges against 
government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy 
as emerging factors in December and January that created an 
opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall. 
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of 
congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on 
television and radio shows is proof of government panic. 
"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win)," 
said xxxxxxxxxxxx.  "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx 
agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's 
hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they 
often know little about."  According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has 
been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his 
speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups 
Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking 
in fluent Aymara.  He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he 
planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public 
officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's 
indigenous languages.  Later he challenged President Morales 
to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks 
poorly. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fraud, Doubts, and Questions 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will 
oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has 
undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public 
of the security of the election rolls, which came under 
scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of 
articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008 
recall referendum.  Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their 
August referendum victory by five to seven points through 
fraud at several levels (reftel C).  While many international 
observers groups are expected to view the January 25 
constitutional referendum -- including the European Union, 
the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the 
South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) -- 
the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's 
confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are 
fair.  Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff 
that they have no faith in international observers.  The 
committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our 
side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of 
thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of 
fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President 
Morales in the August 2008 referendum.  However, the civic 
committee said that the fact that international observers 
blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an 
honest review of the constitutional referendum.  Civic 
committee members also noted that small numbers of observers, 
generally based in the city, will not be able to stop 
widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they 
believe most of the August 10 fraud took place. 
¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence 
in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral 
Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint 
describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS.  As 
part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters 
dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior 
elections and the number added during this cycle.  While all 
departments projected to vote against the constitution had a 
net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos 
and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz 
(38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a 
curious reckoning, considering population and migration 
trends to the contrary. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Pando At Center of Storm, Again 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in 
Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its 
sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best 
chance to win in five departments.  By winning the popular 
vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more 
credibly claim to have support throughout the country.  Pando 
has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a 
breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the 
strength of the MAS continues to rise.  And with fewer than 
32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the 
country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable 
department to even small amounts of fraud or voter 
registration changes. 
¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando 
in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect 
Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to 
swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate.  Besides 
disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting 
many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown 
changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of 
opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new 
security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters 
from the Altiplano (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx added 
that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government 
Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake 
identities via the police role in issuing national identity 
cards (which can then be used to vote).  (Reftel C). 
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January 26: What Happens Next? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that 
a general election prompted by passage of the new 
constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that 
the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the 
forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B).  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which 
grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the 
blanks" with new implementing legislation.  He also said the 
Senate would clash with the government on assigning new 
borders for electoral districts, needed for the general 
election.  xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is 
already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the 
constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation 
that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to."  He said 
Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for 
Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the 
people" and then have President Morales rule by decree 
(Reftel D). 
¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that 
President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a 
deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several 
contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the 
pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel 
to Spain for the operation.  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not 
perform the surgery.  Article 238 is also of consequence to 
the post-January 25 political landscape.  It would establish 
that all other government officials must stand down three 
months before general elections expected in 2009, with the 
notable exception of the president and vice president. 
Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the 
campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the 
opposition-controlled Senate.  It is unclear why the 
opposition waited until the final week before the referendum 
to complain about the article or why they accepted it during 
marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise 
text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to 
under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters 
surrounding the congress and threatening violence. 
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Comment 
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¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a 
referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway. 
While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the 
Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what 
they announce they will do.  In this case, 66 percent seems 
to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out 
all the stops to reach that level.  With at least two-thirds 
support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine 
departments under his belt, President Morales would be able 
to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution 
quickly.  Practically speaking, this will put great pressure 
on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate, 
to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of 
implementation legislation.  If they do not, Morales and 
others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree.  Using 
similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more 
quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia. 
Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with 
the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of 
an issue in December. 
¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the 
MAS victory, not the victory itself.  While Morales continues 
to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President 
Garcia 
Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent 
estimate on January 21.  The margin matters.  If the 
constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many 
observers feel this would represent a relative defeat, 
especially when Morales himself has set such high 
expectations.  On the other hand, we are equally concerned 
that large-margin victories in media luna departments could 
lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and 
resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting 
them on a collision course with the national government.  A 
solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to 
60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from 
claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures. 
URS