Currently released so far... 5420 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI268, INDIA SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NEWDELHI268.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NEWDELHI268 | 2009-02-12 12:12 | 2010-12-16 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy New Delhi |
VZCZCXRO0095
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0268/01 0431248
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121248Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5370
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7372
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3097
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5937
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 6091
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
Thursday, 12 February 2009, 12:48
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 000268
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
HOLBROOKE
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 236 B. DELHI 195
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).
¶1. (C) We welcome your visit to New Delhi as India begins to gear up for parliamentary elections likely to be held in April-May. While popular anger over the November Mumbai attacks has cooled slightly, Indian officials continue to demand that Pakistan respond to Delhi’s demands for action against the attack organizers. On Afghanistan, the Indians have been among President Karzai’s most stalwart supporters and appear opposed to a complete overhaul of international reconstruction efforts, arguing that the focus should be on beefing up security forces and police, particularly in the south and east. Indo-Pakistani relations are in the deep freeze after Mumbai, with bilateral efforts to resolve differences shelved for now. Despite clarifications made at the time your appointment was announced, you will likely face questions from the Indian foreign policy establishment and media over renewed U.S. activism on Kashmir. The successful U.S.-India nuclear deal and a post-Mumbai interest in beefing up counterterrorism cooperation underline our closer strategic partnership. These ties will likely grow regardless of which party prevails in this spring’s elections.
Afghanistan: A Strategic Relationship
--------------------------------------
¶2. (C) India has maintained very close ties with the Karzai government since 2002 and has contributed over USD 1.2 billion in reconstruction assistance during that period, putting India among the top ranks of Afghan donors. The GOI has historically supported friendly governments in Kabul, in part to pressure Pakistan. This has continued under Karzai, who has had long-standing personal ties to India dating back to his four years of post-graduate studies in Himachal Pradesh after the 1979 Soviet invasion. Karzai has visited Delhi seven times since 2002; the last visit was in January of this year when Karzai came to express solidarity with India after the Mumbai attacks.
¶3. (C) GOI officials have expressed growing concern with the security situation in Afghanistan, which is affecting India’s extensive reconstruction projects, and they have been increasingly critical of what they perceive as the Pakistani government’s inability or unwillingness to act in the border tribal belt. India has not distanced itself from Karzai, nor questioned the international community’s approach to Afghan reconstruction. The GOI feels that aspects of reconstruction could be improved, but priority should be given to strengthening the Afghan National Army and police, given the deteriorating situation in southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. The top Afghan expert in the MEA we spoke to last week (Assistant Secretary equivalent) argued that a complete overhaul was not necessary and that the focus should be on the tribal areas. Privately, the GOI has been critical of efforts to bring Taliban elements to the negotiating table, arguing that such attempts have confused Afghan public opinion and fueled popular fears that the Taliban will return through the back door.
¶4. (C) India’s contribution to Afghan reconstruction consists primarily of infrastructure development (including the Parliament building and a road that will connect the Afghan Ring Road to an Iranian port), trade facilities and extensive technical and English-language training. However, the scope of assistance has been quite broad and has touched almost every sector -- telcoms, banking, public administration, transport, energy, aviation and IT. During the January visit, India pledged to provide 250,000 metric tons of wheat in food aid. The U.S. is now working with India and Afghanistan to provide training in India to Afghan energy technicians. India is also a staunch advocate of the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and it believes the USG should do more to make this a reality. We see opportunities for closer coordination on assistance. The GOI should be receptive to partnering with the U.S., but will likely want to portray any such cooperation as part of a de-hyphenated, stand-alone,
NEW DELHI 00000268 002 OF 005
U.S.-India partnership that is global in scope. The GOI is mindful of Pakistani sensitivities on security-related assistance in Afghanistan, but this may be under review in the post-Mumbai environment. External Affairs Minister Mukherjee demurred in response to Secretary Rice’s October 4 request for unspecified Indian support for Afghan security forces, saying India had not provided security support for Afghanistan because of these concerns. Last July’s bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, which the Indians suspect was linked to Pakistan’s ISI, was a stark reminder of the dangers India faces in its involvement in Afghan reconstruction.
Pakistan: A Cold Peace
-----------------------
¶5. (C) The anger over the November Mumbai attacks may be less visible now, but India expects Pakistan to arrest and try Pakistanis involved in planning and organizing the attack and to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. The Mumbai terrorist attacks deeply angered the Indian public. This time, in addition to the reactions against Pakistan, Indians directed a new level of fury at their own political establishment, which they feel failed to protect them. The public’s anger pushed the Congress Party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to shelve the bilateral Composite Dialogue that was focused on resolving contentious issues, including ultimately Kashmir. While the GOI and Congress Party leaders have made muscular statements demanding the GOP investigate and prosecute those involved in the attack and asserting that no option has been foreclosed, India’s strategy has been to pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution. India has launched a worldwide diplomatic offensive to put pressure on Pakistan. India doubts the willingness of Pakistan’s military leadership to take action against the Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) and the civilian leaders’ ability to do so, and assesses that Pakistan will make only token moves to rein in the LeT and its affiliates as it waits for pressure from India or the international community to dissipate.
¶6. (C) You are likely to hear from your Indian interlocutors that professions of good faith on the part of Pakistan’s civilian leadership are insufficient because they lack sufficient control over Pakistan’s many competing power centers. The Pakistani government’s faltering efforts to respond to the Indian dossier on Mumbai -- plagued by cynical denial of Pakistan’s involvement, contradictory press statements by Pakistani officials and missed self-imposed deadlines -- has only strengthened those views. Paradoxically, India found dealing with Musharraf much easier. Foreign Ministry officials believe that any effort to stabilize Pakistan depends on reform of Pakistan’s military establishment. In the abstract, India supports a democratic Pakistan, but sees that as a longer term aspiration. The Foreign Ministry believes the military has steadily gained power at the expense of the civilian government after the Mumbai attacks. As Foreign Secretary Menon observed to the Ambassador earlier this week, “the good guys are losing.”
Jammu and Kashmir Anxiety
-------------------------
¶7. (S) Despite clarifications made at the time your appointment was announced, there is continuing uncertainty and a degree of anxiety within the Indian foreign policy establishment over a perceived interest in U.S. activism on Kashmir. The concern of successive Indian governments over the decades has been that the U.S. would try to pressure India to make concessions that would be unacceptable in India. Our Kashmir mantra during the previous two administrations was that we support any peaceful solution agreed upon by India and Pakistan that takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. On Kashmir, the two countries made considerable progress over the last four years in back channel discussions -- and National Security Advisor Narayanan told Senator Kerry that an agreement in principle was in reach in late 2006. However, President Musharraf’s fall from power coupled with the Kabul and Mumbai attacks have brought a halt to progress on the issue.
NEW DELHI 00000268 003 OF 005
¶8. (C) The GOI believes that the political and security environment today in Kashmir is such that the state could be poised for a sustained period of reconciliation and prosperity. The Indians are particularly elated with the recent violence-free and high-turnout state legislative election they pulled off in Jammu and Kashmir. They believe Kashmiris have rejected the agendas of the Pakistani jihadis and Kashmiri separatists, and are now ready to turn the page away from violence and are seeking good governance and normalization. With Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister, they have in place a young, forward thinking leader who could move the state out of its two decades of political paralysis. It is not clear, however, that the GOI has the political will to make the kinds of gestures -- such as reducing the security forces footprint -- that Kashmiris need to gain some confidence in the Indian intentions.
India Heads to the Polls
------------------------
¶9. (C) The political season entered its final lap this month when the two main political parties held political conferences to kick off their campaigns for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The political establishment will now be single-mindedly focused on these elections until June when the new Parliament convenes and the next government is sworn in. Domestic political considerations will be paramount for the next three months. As the campaign heats up, we can expect the political attacks centered around security questions to get sharper and the rhetoric to become shriller. A relatively easy and no-political-cost punching bag for many parties is likely to be Pakistan, which will be denounced for the Mumbai attacks and accused of supporting terrorists as a state policy.
¶10. (C) The current Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, which appeared to be in trouble only months ago, has recovered smartly. It has successfully deflected the fall-out from the Mumbai terror attacks by keeping the international pressure on Pakistan and announcing plans to strengthen its capacity to fight terrorism. While the economic slow-down remains a growing electoral concern, the government has benefited from a sharp reduction in inflation. In contrast, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had momentum last summer, has suffered of late. It experienced a crushing loss at the hands of the UPA in a parliamentary vote last summer on US-India civil-nuclear initiative. Its mixed performance in recent state elections has been demoralizing to its cadres. It continues to be racked by low intensity but persistent infighting that undermines its image of a well-disciplined political machine.
¶11. (C) It is impossible to predict now which party will emerge on top in the national elections. But it is safe to say that that neither the Congress Party nor the BJP is likely to win a majority on its own and either will have to forge a coalition with the smaller regional parties to form a government. While both the BJP and the Congress support a closer U.S.-India relationship, their ability to move forward aggressively will be constrained by the disproportionate power of smaller parties, which have narrower agendas that frequently do not extend to foreign policy issues. The worst scenario for the U.S.-India relationship would be one in which a “Third Front” forms a government that excludes both the Congress Party and the BJP. Under those circumstances, the Communist parties will likely wield great influence in a coalition. Nevertheless, the nuclear deal and a closer strategic relationship with the United States have generated an extraordinary public debate in India during the last year. We have won this debate hands down and, as a result, the U.S.-India relationship has a strong foundation on which to grow over the coming decades.
Increased Law Enforcement Cooperation
-------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Following Mumbai, we have offered counterterrorism assistance and encouraged the GOI to focus on improving security preparedness and prevention of terrorist attacks.
NEW DELHI 00000268 004 OF 005
Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure is now perceived as a permanent threat. We have already seen unprecedented law enforcement cooperation between India and the U.S., primarily with the FBI. Historically, the GOI had been a reluctant law enforcement partner. But after Mumbai, it dropped its resistance and allowed FBI teams in Mumbai to provide investigatory assistance. Significantly, the high level of cooperation has included FBI access to the sole living terrorist. The Indians have also become far more amenable to accepting our many offers of counterterrorism assistance. The Mumbai attacks have gone a long way to convincing the GOI that no country can combat terrorism alone and that countries need to cooperate with one another to address this scourge. One of our next big challenges is to spur increased defense sales and cooperation. This will depend in part on the GOI’s acceptance of foundational agreements such as End Use Monitoring.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
¶13. (SBU) The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was approved by a large bipartisan majority in the House and Senate in September, signed by Secretary Rice and External Affairs Minister Mukherjee in Washington October 10, and brought into force by an exchange of diplomatic notes on December 6. India viewed the signing of the Agreement as an historic event and an essential element in the transformation of our relationship. The Agreement no longer dominates headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to improved cooperation following the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
¶14. (C) Implementation of the Agreement requires India to take a number of steps. India must bring its IAEA safeguards agreement into force and file a declaration of safeguarded facilities to initiate civil nuclear cooperation with the world. For the United States to fully realize the commercial benefits of cooperation, India must also follow through on its commitment to set aside nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms -- as it has already done for France and Russia -- and address other industry concerns, such as patent protection and adoption of domestic liability protection. Indian officials also seem to be tying U.S. company access to the conclusion of an additional bilateral arrangement regarding India,s right to reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. Successful implementation of the Agreement will provide access to an estimated $150 billion in commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and lead to the creation of up to 30,000 American jobs over the next three decades. It will also help protect the Congressional bipartisan consensus for India and preserve the unprecedented popularity of the United States among Indians, on which our growing bilateral relationship depends.
Regional Issues
---------------
¶15. (C) Under Prime Minister Singh’s leadership, the GOI is emerging as a responsible leader in the region, as well as in Asia at large. India encourages democracy in the region, mostly leading by example, but is worried by continuing political instability in nearly every neighboring country, and in practice seems to value stability over democracy when it comes to foreign policy. We follow closely India ‘s “complex relationship” -- as Indian officials have called it -- with China, the dynamics of which will significantly affect not only Asia as a power center of the 21st century, but directly impact U.S. interests from the Pacific to the Cape of Good Hope. India-China relations can most easily be described as a mutual desire to seek warmer relations through strategic dialogue, however contentious border issues and emerging economic/political power rivalry constrain broader engagement. We still diverge with India over tactics towards Iran and Burma, although we ostensibly share the same strategic goals. The encouraging news for U.S. interests is that whereas India over the previous 40-odd years had tended to quickly and suspiciously dismiss U.S. intentions in the region, our recent improvement in relations have made Delhi much more amenable to cooperating on regional issues, as evidenced by our efforts together ranging from tsunami relief
NEW DELHI 00000268 005 OF 005
to Nepalese democracy to anti-piracy in the Gulf and off Somalia. Trend lines suggest the opportunity for even greater cooperation is ripe.
Your Meetings
-------------
¶16. (U) Prime Minister Singh has not resumed a working schedule following his recent quintuple by-pass surgery. You have confirmed meetings with External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and a lunch with National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan. Foreign Secretary Menon may be your first meeting of the day. We have not been able to confirm a meeting with Home Minister P. Chidambaram, who will be busy with the parliamentary debate on the budget that will take place the day of your meetings. MULFORD