Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 5420 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE87, NETHERLANDS/IRAN: PHILIPS NOT ACTIVE IN IRAN'S ENERGY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09THEHAGUE87.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09THEHAGUE87 2009-02-09 10:10 2011-01-19 20:08 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXRO6141
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDIR RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
RUEHSR
DE RUEHTC #0087 0401043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091043Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2495
INFO RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 4124
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000087

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET ETTC ETRD PREL NL IR
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: PHILIPS NOT ACTIVE IN IRAN'S ENERGY
SECTOR

Ref: (A) 08 STATE 125579, (B) THE HAGUE 2, (C)
GRAY-NEPHEW-COULTER-GROEN EMAILS 02/02/09

1. (U) This cable contains proprietary company information. Please
protect accordingly.

2. (SBU) Summary: In response to questions regarding its possible
licensing of LNG technology to Iran, Royal Philips Electronics
emphasized that it has no activities whatsoever in the LNG field,
especially not in Iran. Philips does export some lighting, consumer
electronics, and medical equipment to Iran, but always in accordance
with international export control laws. End summary.

3. (SBU) Econoff met January 28 with Mr. Guy Kerpen, Director of
Government Relations, and Mr. Wolter Boerman, Vice President of
Corporate Export Controls and Supply Chain Security, at Royal
Philips Electronics. Per Ref A request, Econoff sought information
about Philips' possible provision to Iran of licensing for LNG
projects. The Philips representatives said the company had no
activities whatsoever in LNG or energy production in general, let
alone with Iran. Boerman said he had reviewed Philips' historical
records to confirm the company had never been involved in
researching, developing, producing, or marketing any type of LNG
technology. He also contacted Philips' office in Dubai to confirm
that it had never discussed conducting LNG-related activities with
Iran.

4. (SBU) Unlike Royal Dutch Shell, which does maintain investments
in Iran's energy sector (ref B), Philips manufactures lighting,
healthcare products, and consumer electronics. Its only business
with Iran, according to Kerpen and Boerman, is the sale of products
such as coffee makers, electric razors, lamps, and light bulbs.
Philips also sells some medical equipment to Iran; these are the
only products for which Philips routinely applies for U.S. licenses.
Boerman explained that over 55 percent of Philips' assets are based
in the United States, and the company therefore takes compliance
with U.S. export regulations regarding Iran very seriously.
Although the U.S. government requires exporters to acquire a license
if more than 10 percent of the medical equipment's content is
produced in the United States, Philips acquires a license for any of
its products with more than 2 percent of U.S. content - just to be
safe.

5. (SBU) Kerpen and Boerman expressed dismay at the U.S.
government's suggestion that Philips had any involvement in Iran's
energy sector and asked where we had obtained such information.
They stressed Philips' interest in correcting any misinformation in
the national measures campaign of the E4+1 governments (ref A).
Philips takes its international reputation extremely seriously and
carefully follows all UN, EU, U.S., and other international
obligations related to doing business in restricted countries. The
company recognizes the public relations damage that accusations of
improper dealings can cause; hence its dismay at the USG's
questions.

6. (SBU) Per Department guidance (ref C), Econoff explained that
during the course of discussions with our E4+1 partners, one of them
had advised that Philips might be involved in licensing LNG
technology to Iran. Econoff assured Philips that the USG would
relay its response to our partners in order to correct the error.
GALLAGHER