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Viewing cable 09HERMOSILLO71, FRAUD SUMMARY---HERMOSILLO (SEPTEMBER 2008-FEBRUARY 2009)
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09HERMOSILLO71 | 2009-03-24 18:06 | 2011-02-18 12:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Consulate Hermosillo |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/fraudes-visas-guadalajara-hermosillo |
VZCZCXRO8588
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHHO #0071/01 0831851
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241851Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2689
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 3228
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC
198618
2009-03-24 18:51:00
09HERMOSILLO71
Consulate Hermosillo
UNCLASSIFIED
VZCZCXRO8588
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHHO #0071/01 0831851
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241851Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2689
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 3228
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HERMOSILLO 000071
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT PTER MX
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY---HERMOSILLO (SEPTEMBER 2008-FEBRUARY 2009)
HERMOSILLO 00000071 001.2 OF 005
¶A. CONSULATE HERMOSILLO CONDITIONS - There is significant
fraud within the consular district, most of which is related to
the fabrication or alteration of documents that are used to
demonstrate employment and economic solvency. Most of the other
fraud encountered relates to concealing illegal or illicit
behavior such as a history of controlled substance violations,
alien smuggling or unlawful presence in the United States.
Applicants from Sinaloa, in the southern part of the consular
district, tend to present more fraudulent documents and their
quality tends to be higher. Sinaloa is also the source for most
of the drug trafficking and alien smuggling cases the Fraud
Prevention Unit (FPU) investigates.
¶B. NON-IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD - The majority of the fraud at the
Consulate is related to the issuance of BBBCC cards or Machine
Readable Visas (MRV). However, during the previous year there
has been a marked increase in detection of fraud associated with
P and O visas.
i. STATISTICS - The reporting period for the statistics is
September through February. Over this period the FPU investigated
426 cases and determined that 134 of them were fraudulent. The
result was a total of 134 refusals including family members.
There were 43 cases marked clearly fraudulent by the
adjudicators (using the "Suspicious Docs" box), resulting in 27
refusals, including family members. There were many more cases
in which fraud was suspected or known, but that were not
formally referred to the FPU as the applicants did not overcome
214(b). The decrease in cases referred through the NIV system
compared with previous reporting periods is attributable to a
more than 30 percent drop in visa workload in Hermosillo, yet
reflects a consistent level of fraud albeit lower overall case
numbers during this reporting period. The incidence of fraud has
remained at consistent levels over the last few reporting
periods.
ii. DEATH FRAUD - Post continues to see falsified
documentation regarding the alleged death of a spouse or parent
of an applicant. The majority of the situations involve the
applicant attempting to distance him or herself from the
allegedly deceased spouse, who had committed a crime or had a
visa ineligibility or, in some situations, was alive and well
and working in the United States illegally. Adjudicators are
trained to be suspicious of cases involving young and recently
widowed individuals, particularly when the manner of death is
accidental or violent and where the death certificate describes
the official cause of death in layman's (i.e., non-medical)
terms (e.g., "firearm" or "car accident"). Most of the
fraudulent claims have been uncovered through questioning of the
applicants, which reveals inconsistencies in their stories.
Adjudicators are also able to utilize the FPU's contacts with
the civil registries in the states of Sinaloa and Sonora to
check on the validity of death certificates presented in the
interviews. Websites and blogs have also been useful in
uncovering inconsistencies and misrepresentations and often give
specific details regarding the spouse's death. Frequently these
cases result in uncovering links to narcotics trafficking rings.
iii. MARRIAGE FRAUD - Post has had several cases of claims
to marriage that were determined to be false. Almost all of the
incidents were uncovered when the alleged spouses were
questioned separately because of suspicions about the validity
of the documents or claims. The prevalence of union libre
(common-law) marriages in Mexico makes ascertaining true
relationships difficult and applicants often use this ambiguous
terminology to obfuscate their true socioeconomic ties and
intentions. Applicants have presented documents attesting to
their legal spouse's employment and solvency while concealing
that they do not in fact live with this person but rather with a
long-term union libre partner.
iv. PARENT FRAUD - It is very common for people to falsely
represent themselves as the parents of a minor child by
presenting a valid Mexican birth certificate issued on false
information. In a presentation the head of the civil registry
for the state of Sonora gave at the consulate, we learned that
the civil registry does not question or investigate, or
otherwise concern itself with, the legitimacy of parentage
HERMOSILLO 00000071 002.2 OF 005
claims. Rather, it simply accepts an individual's claim that
the child is his or hers (even if the alleged parent is quite
elderly or there is a significant delay in reporting the birth)
and issues a valid birth certificate. FPU has determined that
the majority of such cases involve grandparents or other
relatives claiming to be the child's parents, oftentimes because
one or both of the child's natural parents are illegally present
in the United States or otherwise ineligible for visa issuance.
Since the certificates are validly issued and registered, the
onus is on the adjudicator to uncover the fraud through
questioning and common sense. Typical fraud indicators are the
age of the mother at the time of birth, the age gap between the
alleged parent's other children, late registration of the birth
certificate (more than six months), and the alleged mother's
inability to credibly describe the circumstances of the birth or
pregnancy (including claims that she gave birth at home with no
doctor present, had no pre-natal care, etc.). In two recent
cases, consular officers uncovered this type of fraud by noting
close CLASS hits for prior 214(b) refusals. In both cases there
was a slight name difference (different second surname) and the
applicant had two valid Mexican identities. In one of these
cases, FPU determined that during the first application the
alleged father was found to be a narcotics trafficker and that
the minor child's aunt had posed as his mother during the second
application. The fact that children under seven years of age are
not required to appear for these interviews is a significant
vulnerability because adjudicators are unable to observe the
interaction between child and "parent".
v. H2 VISAS - H2 applicants routinely present themselves
inaccurately concerning their previous illegal presence in the
U.S. Generally speaking, most fraud is perpetrated on an
individual level. Company and or petitioner perpetrated fraud
among H2A and H2B petitioners is low, although Post has recently
adjudicated several cases in which the facilitating company was
charging exorbitant fees to applicants who provided information
during their interviews that contradicted the information
provided to DHS during their petition requests. Post continues
to send these petitions to DHS for revocation consideration.
Post also investigates several suspicious cases involving
"head-hunter" agencies that find labor for agricultural
companies or construction businesses. In many instances, we have
contacted the "head hunter" agencies and have inquired about
contracts only to find that there are no contracts in place
other than verbal recognition on the part of the company
receiving the labor. The FPU hired a new LES member in January
2008 who concentrates on investigating H and L petitions. Since
the addition of the LES member, we have developed a screening
process for petitioning companies. The FPU conducts research on
the petitioner using Google and Lexus Nexus to confirm the
validity of the petitioning company. In August 2008, the FPM and
the LES that conducts H & L investigations traveled to Monterrey
to observe their FPU and how they conduct H & L investigations
and since then several of these measures have been incorporated
into Hermosillo's investigative practices.
vi. P and O Visas - Post continues to investigate multiple
P-1 and O-2 petitions filed over the past year by Susan M.
Jeannette Talent Agent, aka The Law Offices of Kevin M. Tracy,
aka North County Legalization Services. The results of these
investigations lead us to firmly believe the petitioner is
attempting to subvert immigration laws in order to obtain visas
for clients under repeatedly false pretense and/or outright
misrepresentation. Petition revocation requests were sent to KCC
on several petitions involving the same petitioner. The FPU has
also learned that other consulates in Mexico have had similar
experiences with this petitioner and have sent several cases to
KCC for petition revocation consideration. In the course of our
investigation, we have obtained fraudulent contracts for
performances produced by the petitioner and signed confessions
by an applicant that implicates the petitioner directly in a
scheme to fraudulently obtain a visa. We have requested that
KCC FPU open an investigation on this petitioner and have also
referred this case to the A/RSO-I at Post.
¶C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD - Post does not process Immigrant
Visas
¶D. DIVERSITY VISAS - Post does not process diversity visas
HERMOSILLO 00000071 003.2 OF 005
¶E. AMERICAN CITIZEN SERVICES AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD - The ACS
fraud concerning passport applications has been negligible to
this point, though it is expected to increase under the recently
implemented Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) land
border crossing requirements. In this reporting period, FPU
investigated 7 cases of suspected passport fraud. Six of these
cases resulted in a finding of fraud not indicated and one is
outstanding with a suggestion of DNA evidence submission.
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD - Post does not process adoptions of
Mexican nationals by American citizens
¶G. USE OF DNA TESTING - Post primarily uses DNA testing as a
means of assuring that transmission requirements are met for
CRBA cases. ACS has used DNA testing in six instances during
this reporting period. In four of the six incidences, the DNA
results have supported the applicant's claims; two cases are
outstanding. DNA is oftentimes the only viable means of
confirming the relationships that are claimed due to either a
lack of evidence or conflicting evidence. Post makes suggestions
for DNA testing to be conducted on such cases but makes it known
that DNA tests are not required. The most common DNA cases are
those in which the father of the child in question was either
not married to the mother at the time of conception or was
married to another woman. ACS has also had multiple cases where
a man has a family in the U.S. but also claims to be the father
of children with a Mexican mother. DNA testing has also been
suggested in cases when the identity of the mother is in
question. However, in several cases the applicants have backed
down from their claims of being the biological parents or simply
have never completed the test. In these few rare cases the lack
of willingness to complete the DNA test is usually seen as
admission that the claim was false. FPU began an investigation
on February 24 involving a Mexican woman and a member of the
U.S. armed forces attempting to obtain a CRBA for a child she
claims to have given birth to recently. Because of
inconsistencies and changes in her story regarding the
approximate date of conception, where she received her prenatal
care, FPU requested that she consider DNA testing. She was
unwilling to do undergo this procedure, stating that she wanted
the alleged father to believe her story without submitting
proof. Corroborating evidence such as the absence of a record in
the federal online birth registry, a mismatch on footprint size
on the birth record, and her claim that the child was born in
Durango but registered in Sonora also suggest fraudulent
activity. FPU is current continuing the investigation.
¶H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD - No cases have been
uncovered during the reporting period.
¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST
TRAVEL - During this reporting period, post has investigated
several cases involving suspected alien smuggling networks that
provide fraudulent documents to NIV applicants. The FPU
regularly interviews applicants suspected of having association
with the smuggling networks and generally have encountered an
unwillingness to provide any information. Organized crime
related to narcotics trafficking in the consular district is an
on-going concern for Post. During the previous reporting period,
the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) designated several individuals residing in our consular
district pursuant to the 1999 Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation act. Post revoked visas for each individual named
who had been issued in Hermosillo.
¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS - The A/RSO-I program at
Post began operations in January 2008. The FPM consults directly
with the NIV Chief, ACS Chief and/or CSC regarding cases that
are deemed appropriate for referral to the A/RSO-I, in
accordance with the SOP established during the previous
reporting period. There are three broad categories of fraud that
are referred to the A/RSO-I. (1) Cases that appear to have links
to terrorism, organized crime, large scale alien smuggling or
trafficking in persons; (2) cases involving wanted persons (WP
Class hits); (3) cases indicating a large, complex and/or
on-going fraud operation. The FPM and A/RSO-I hold bi-weekly
meetings to discuss on-going cases. The NIV chief, CSC and RSO
also attend the meetings. The meetings are used to track the
progress of cases and to provide feedback to the consular
section on pending cases.
HERMOSILLO 00000071 004.2 OF 005
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL
REGISTRY - The Mexican government has updated the Mexican
passport twice since the beginning of 2008. The issuing
government agency, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE),
has been cooperative in sharing information related to security
features in each version of the passport. Post has incorporated
the passport security features into the post-specific fraud
training that it conducts with new officers. Identity documents
are an on-going concern for both NIV and ACS. Mexican Citizens
(or TCNs) can obtain with relative ease valid official identity
documents from both the Sonoran and Sinaloan Government's Vital
Records offices containing falsified information. The standards
of proof for vital records are much less stringent than in the
U.S. and Mexican Vital Records offices accept documents from
citizens "bona fide" in the issuance of official identity
documents. The cases most commonly observed are birth
certificates obtained with falsified information. This is a
particular area of vulnerability as Mexican Citizens can obtain
a valid Mexican passport with a birth certificate obtained
through fraudulent information. During this reporting period the
FPU has investigating several incidents of suspected Mexican
passport fraud whereby children have two known identities (as
referred to in the section on parent fraud) as well as one case
referred to us by the Lukeville, AZ POE in which the subject had
a validly-issued Mexican passport, Sonora state driver's
license, and federal voter ID card. SRE and the Sonora civil
registry confirmed with FPU that while these documents were
issued by competent state and federal authorities, the
information, specifically the birth certificate, used to obtain
them, was falsified. This case outlines the lax standards
applied to citizenship determination by Mexican authorities as
well as the ease with which individuals are able to suborn
public officials to obtain primary documents attesting to their
assumed identity.
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES - The FPU
continues to maintain good cooperation with both host government
officials as well as contacts within private institutions such
as banks. FPU and the NIV unit continue to secure access to
local, state and federal government databases which greatly help
resolve cases referred to FPU during ACS and NIV adjudications.
The FPU has used these resources to assist not only the NIV and
ACS sections, but also USCIS field offices in the U.S. seeking
to verify applicants' sworn testimony. In once recent case, the
FPU was able to show that an individual was involved in a
bigamous relationship and therefore ineligible for residency as
the spouse of a U.S. citizen. The A/RSO-I continues to hold
meetings with officials from Procuraduria General de la
Republica (PGR), Agencia Federal de Investigaciones (AFI),
Policia Federal Preventiva (PFP), and Policia Estatal Preventiva
(PEP) to address issues regarding U.S. passport fraud and human
trafficking. The A/RSO-I reports a willingness on the part of
the PGR to pursue prosecutions against individuals and
organizations that perpetrate visa and passport-related fraud,
although in practice these institutions often exhibit
reservations in acting on these types of cases and when PGR or
AFI have made arrests, prosecution has been haphazard and
unaggressive. Last month the ARSO-I program hired an FSN-I to
assist in these investigations and Post is hopeful that this
additional resource will increase local government cooperation.
¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -
i. The FPU and NIV unit have noticed an unusually high
number of applicants filing lost/stolen visa reports, often
months or years after the alleged incident. In many of these
cases there are strong fraud indicators including late filing of
a police report, filing in a jurisdiction other than where the
alleged incident took place, and failing to report any other
valuables lost in a home robbery or purse snatching. Because of
the relative ease of selling or renting a border crossing card
and the sheer number of I-275 reports on visa imposters using
border crossing cards, Post has serious concerns about the
incidence of visa sale/rental and is currently instituting
policies to investigate these claims more thoroughly. Post
continues to actively monitor the incidence in fraud associated
with Border Crossing Cards.
HERMOSILLO 00000071 005.2 OF 005
ii. Post has had great success in uncovering visa fraud
using two simple but often overlooked technologies. The first is
Independent Name Check (INK). Post has implemented a policy to
perform an INK inquiry on spouses and parents of visa applicants
who do not hold visas and are not applying at the same time as
the applicant. Often this scenario results in finding out that
the spouse or parent who "doesn't like to travel" actually has a
history of unlawful presence in the U.S. and/or a criminal
record. In some cases, such as drug trafficking, this results in
an ineligibility finding for the applicant as well. The second
strategy, recently recognized by Secretary Clinton in a town
hall meeting in Washington, is utilizing social networking sites
like Facebook. An officer in Hermosillo recently uncovered a
network of young professionals from upper-class families
residing in Boston, Massachusetts after having obtained border
crossing cards for tourist travel.
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING - The FPM is a rotation among Entry
Level Officers (ELO) at Post. Currently the FPM is XXXXXXXXXX, who took over the rotation in February 2008. ELO
XXXXXXXXXXXX attended PC541 at FSI in February as he began his
rotation. The next ELO rotation into the FPM role is expected in
October 2009. The FPU staff consists of three FSNs, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, all FSN-7s. XXXXXXXXXXXX
attended PC542 for FSN fraud investigators in March 2008 at FSI
and XXXXXXXXXXXX attended a Mexico-wide FSN fraud conference in
Ciudad Juarez in February 2008 and PC542 at FSI in March 2009.
All FSNs in the FPU have participated in FSI Distance Learning.
BREIDENSTINE