Currently released so far... 5420 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2063, PRC LEADERSHIP STABLE DESPITE TENSIONS; XI STILL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
 - The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
 - The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
 
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING2063.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin | 
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09BEIJING2063 | 2009-07-20 10:10 | 2010-12-28 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing | 
VZCZCXRO1479
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2063/01 2011043
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201043Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002063 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/3034 
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: PRC LEADERSHIP STABLE DESPITE TENSIONS; XI STILL 
ON TOP 
REF: A. BEIJING 2040 
¶B. SHENYANG 127 
Classified By: Acting Political Minster Counselor Benjamin Moeling. Re 
asons 1.4 (b/d). 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) Embassy contacts have reported that relations among 
China's top leaders remained largely stable, and the 
arrangements put in train for succession at the 18th Party 
Congress in 2012 appeared to be holding, with Xi Jinping 
likely to become Party chief and Li Keqiang to become 
Premier. Three years out, however, this succession scenario 
was by no means guaranteed, contacts contended, as a number 
of factors could cause Xi to stumble. End Summary. 
Tense, but Stable, Succession in Place... 
------------------------------------------ 
¶2. (C) Echoing views we have heard from a number of contacts 
over the past several months XXXXXXXXXXXX, told PolOff 
on May 13 that the Party leadership, in general, was 
"stable." Chen said it was too early to be certain about the 
outcome of the 18th Party Congress in 2012, but that he 
considered Xi Jinping to still be the front runner and Li 
Keqiang the runner-up. On May 26, XXXXXXXXXXXX
senior editor at the Central Committee paper Guangming Ribao, 
separately agreed that the final succession outcome was too 
early to call but that the situation at the top was stable. 
All the leaders know that they had to hang together, Dong 
said, or they would hang separately. That was the lesson of 
the 1989 Tiananmen unrest and the fall of the former Soviet 
Union, according to Dong. 
¶3. XXXXXXXXXXXX who served on the Central 
Committee General Office research staff when Premier Wen 
Jiabao was General Office Director in the late 1980s, stated 
in a meeting with PolOffs on May 18 that despite natural 
tensions and differences of view, the leadership was "very 
stable" and will remain so through 2012. In his view, Deng's 
final legacy to the Party was a system designed to avoid the 
vicious infighting of the past. The leadership lineup put in 
place at the 17th Congress was not likely to change, with Xi 
Jinping most likely becoming Party General Secretary and Li 
Keqiang taking the Premier slot. 
Hu to Retain CMC Chair? 
----------------------- 
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX separately predicted that, as things now 
stand, Hu Jintao would probably stay on as Central Military 
Commission Chair at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, 
following the example of former Party chief Jiang Zemin in 
¶2002. Chen dismissed the possibility of Hu trying to retain 
his positions of General Secretary and President, even though 
there was no formal rule mandating that he step down. There 
was strong consensus in the Party against China's top leader 
serving beyond two five-year "terms." Chen claimed that Li 
Changchun, He Guoqiang, and Zhou Yongkang, widely perceived 
as belonging to the Jiang Zemin-Zeng Qinghong political 
network, had all "sided with" and "supported" Hu Jintao and, 
in return, hoped this would pay dividends for their political 
allies in 2012. As a result, Chen asserted, Hu Jintao was 
now "very strong," even though he still must rule primarily 
through consensus as the "first among equals" among the 
nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). 
... But Succession Sweepstakes Not Set in Stone 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said, it 
was still "very early," and Xi could "stumble," potentially 
resulting in changes to the lineup in 2012. For example, if 
Hu's strength continued to grow, Hu might yet try to elevate 
Li Keqiang into the top job, Chen calculated. Chen said that 
the upcoming provincial personnel reshuffles would provide 
one clue to the leadership plans for 2012 as well as a 
barometer to measure Hu's strength. 
¶6. XXXXXXXXXXXX formerly international page 
columnist of China Youth Daily, told PolOff on March 11 that 
one should not assume that Xi's promotion to Party chief was 
inevitable. Xi's role as PRC Vice President was "useless," 
Wang said, and there had only been one succession in Party 
history that went according to plan, the transfer of power 
from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in 2002. Wang said that rumors 
continued to circulate that people were trying to undermine 
BEIJING 00002063 002 OF 002 
Xi as heir apparent. Wang claimed that Xi's extended 
diplomatic visits to Mexico and five Latin American and 
Caribbean nations, February 8-23, were unusual for a Vice 
President and speculated that Xi may have been sent hoping he 
would perform poorly and show that he was not cut out to be 
China's top leader. Xi's "inappropriate" comments in Mexico, 
Wang huffed, were unbecoming a Vice President and showed that 
Xi was not very well cultivated (ge ren xiu yang bu hao). 
(Note: In Mexico, Xi lashed out at "idle foreigners with 
nothing better to do" than criticize China.) The CYL group 
still hoped Li Keqiang could takeover from Hu, Wang stated. 
(See Ref B for rumors of possible maneuvering between Xi and 
Li in China's northeast.) 
Wen-Hu Tensions Downplayed 
-------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Chen dismissed reports in Western media of tension 
between Wen and Hu. In particular, he discounted 
interpretations of Wen's absence at the May 12 memorial 
ceremony commemorating last year's Wenchuan earthquake as 
evidence of such tension. Chen stated that it would be 
unusual for both Hu and Wen to appear together at such an 
event, noting that there was only one other Politburo 
Standing Committee member present, seventh-ranking Li 
Keqiang XXXXXXXXXXXX  was not a 
sign of tension with Hu. Wu attributed the absence of Wen 
photographs in the commemorative displays, which many 
observers claimed was a sign of tension because of Wen's high 
profile presence in Wenchuan at the time of the earthquake, 
to political maneuvering by Sichuan Party Secretary Liu 
Qibao. Liu, a CYL-faction official in Hu's camp, was simply 
trying to curry favor with Hu, according to Wu. Wu 
maintained that despite natural differences of views between 
Hu and Wen, the two had a very close working relationship 
which would continue until the next leadership turnover in 
¶2012. (See Ref A for persistent criticism of Wen Jiabao). 
Jiang and Zeng Retain Influence 
------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) Wu Jiaxiang said that former Party chief Jiang Zemin 
remained powerful but that his influence was waning over 
time. Chen Jieren similarly told PolOff last fall that Jiang 
could not be dismissed as a factor in leadership politics but 
that his age and ill health were starting to erode his 
authority. Chen dismissed rumors circulating last year that 
Hu Jintao was attempting to undermine Jiang, stating that it 
"made no sense" for Hu to risk provoking a conflict when 
Jiang's influence was already decreasing. 
¶9. (C) Chen claimed that former PBSC member, and close Jiang 
ally, Zeng Qinghong also retained considerable influence and 
that Jiang exercised influence through Zeng. Wu, who knows 
Zeng Qinghong personally, said that Zeng was still powerful 
and exercised his influence through Xi Jinping. Zeng was one 
of Xi's strong supporters in the General Secretary 
sweepstakes at the 17th Party Congress, according to Wu. Wu 
added that it was not strange that Zeng had withdrawn from 
public view since he retired. In addition to current Party 
norms which favored retired leaders staying out of public 
view, Zeng shunned the limelight of his own accord. In 
addition, Zeng had been suffering from minor health problems 
lately. 
Biographical Note on Zeng Qinghong 
------------------------- 
¶10. (C) Zeng was one of the most open-minded of all 
contemporary Chinese leaders and was a strong supporter of 
political reform, according to Wu Jiaxiang. In Wu's view, 
had Zeng become Party General Secretary, he would have led 
China toward democracy. While Zeng was a strong supporter of 
former Party paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, Zeng's mindset 
was closer to that of former Party chiefs Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang and former Politburo members Wan Li and Xi Zhongxun, 
Wu claimed. In addition, Wu said that Zeng had "a big heart" 
and was somewhat of an unsung hero within the Party who had 
quietly come to the aid of many comrades in trouble. Wu 
related a personal experience with Zeng following the 
military crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989 when Wu, 
having attempted suicide, was "covered with blood," and Zeng 
used his influence to ensure that Wu was promptly sent to a 
hospital and treated for his wounds. Zeng "saved my life," 
Wu related, adding that Zeng had similarly "saved" many other 
people 
GOLDBERG