Currently released so far... 5420 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AJ
ASEC
AMGT
AR
AU
AG
AS
AM
AORC
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
AGMT
CH
CASC
CA
CD
CV
CVIS
CMGT
CO
CI
CU
CBW
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CIA
CG
CF
CN
CS
CAN
COUNTER
CDG
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CACM
CDB
EPET
EINV
ECON
ENRG
EAID
ETRD
EG
ETTC
EFIN
EU
EAGR
ELAB
EIND
EUN
EAIR
ER
ECIN
ECPS
EFIS
EI
EINT
EZ
EMIN
ET
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ES
ECA
ELN
EN
EFTA
EWWT
ELTN
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ENVI
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IR
IZ
IS
IT
INTERPOL
IPR
IN
INRB
IAEA
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IV
IWC
IQ
ICTY
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
ICAO
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KCOR
KZ
KDEM
KN
KNNP
KPAL
KU
KWBG
KCRM
KE
KISL
KAWK
KSCA
KS
KSPR
KJUS
KFRD
KTIP
KPAO
KTFN
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KGHG
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KDRG
KIRF
KIRC
KBIO
KHLS
KG
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KOMC
KTLA
KCFC
KTIA
KHIV
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KSUM
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KGCC
KPIN
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MTCRE
MX
MCAP
MO
MNUC
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MIL
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
ODIP
OIIP
OREP
OVIP
OEXC
OPRC
OFDP
OPDC
OTRA
OSCE
OAS
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
PGOV
PINR
PREL
PTER
PK
PHUM
PE
PARM
PBIO
PINS
PREF
PSOE
PBTS
PL
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PROP
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
POL
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
POGOV
PINL
SCUL
SA
SY
SP
SNAR
SENV
SU
SW
SOCI
SL
SG
SMIG
SO
SF
SR
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
SNARCS
STEINBERG
TX
TW
TU
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TS
TBIO
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UG
UP
UV
US
UN
UNSC
UNGA
USEU
USUN
UY
UZ
UNO
UNMIK
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09CARACAS982, CHAVEZ DETERMINED TO ACCELERATE HIS REVOLUTION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CARACAS982.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09CARACAS982 | 2009-07-28 20:08 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Caracas |
VZCZCXRO8634
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHCV #0982/01 2092053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 282053Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3463
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000982
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2024
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ DETERMINED TO ACCELERATE HIS REVOLUTION
REF: CARACAS 933
CARACAS 00000982 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA JOHN CAULFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. President Hugo Chavez appears determined to
enact a series of controversial laws covering the electoral
process, education, social property, and the criminal penal
code that are vital tenets of his Bolivarian Revolution and
would further consolidate his power. Many of the laws are
repackaged from previous failed legislative efforts that
proved too unpopular with the Venezuelan electorate. Chavez
likely calculates that now is the time to move forward
aggressively and take advantage of the fact that many
Venezuelans are unaware of the practical significance of the
legislation or may dismiss it as just one more debate in the
ongoing dispute between Chavez and the opposition.
Additionally, he may be trying to pass the series of
unpopular laws in short order and bank on the fact that
voters will have accommodated to the new situation by the
time elections roll around next year. The opposition will be
hard pressed to rally its troops against laws that have yet
to be implemented and are hard to comprehend, especially
during the summer lull when university students and many in
the opposition are on vacation. Chavez can be expected to
apply these laws selectively against a limited number of
individuals and institutions as an example to the rest. END
SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------------
ACCELERATING THE REVOLUTION BECAUSE HE CAN
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Speaking at an event on July 25 commemorating the
10-year anniversary of the National Assembly's effort to
rewrite Venezuela's constitution, Chavez said he is willing
to rule by decree to push through new "revolutionary" laws,
and called on legislators to accelerate the country's path to
socialism. These controversial laws cover issues such as the
electoral process, education, social property, and the
criminal code that would allow the government further control
of almost all aspects of Venezuelan life. Contacts in the
political opposition and local academic community had already
expected the National Assembly to pass these laws in the
coming months to take advantage of the summer lull when most
Venezuelans are focused on their vacations. They tell us
that because Chavez already has total control of the rubber
stamp Assembly, the manner of how the laws are enacted is not
as important as the fact that he is determined to enact them.
Chavez has called for the passage of all of these laws by
December 15, the 10-year anniversary of the enactment of the
country's "Bolivarian" constitution.
¶3. (C) The electoral law would limit the ability of small
political parties to claim legislative seats at all levels of
government and would almost certainly increase Chavez's
chances of retaining a majority in the National Assembly
after elections expected in late 2010. This law would appear
to weaken previous safeguards on the transparency of the
electoral process and secrecy of the vote and would give
unprecedented discretion to the Chavez-dominated National
Electoral Council. The education law (REFTEL) is expected to
further politicize the official curriculum along socialist
lines and make it harder for independent minded teachers and
administrators to obtain jobs in public schools. The social
property law has been dubbed the "Cuban Law" by critics who
claim the new rule would allow the government to expropriate
individual homes and businesses. The penal code reform would
expand state control over criminal proceedings and, most
controversially, require banks and telecommunications
companies to record and make available to state officials all
phone calls, emails, and banking transactions in Venezuela.
We will report on all of these laws in more detail via
SEPTEL.
-------------------
BACK TO THE FUTURE
-------------------
¶4. (SBU) Many of the "new" laws currently in front of the
National Assembly are vital tenets of Chavez's Bolivarian
Revolution but are repackaged from the unsuccessful December
2007 referendum and other failed legislative efforts that
proved too unpopular with the Venezuelan electorate. A 2001
proposal to reform the country's under-performing education
system galvanized the opposition, led to massive street
demonstrations by parents, teachers, and school
administrators, and was one of the catalysts for the April
CARACAS 00000982 002.2 OF 002
2002 coup. The penal code reform contains the spirit of the
deeply unpopular "Ley Sapo" (Snitch Law) that Chavez passed
by decree in May 2008 and then subsequently revoked due to
public backlash. Elements of the social property law were
first proposed as a modification to the constitution that was
defeated in the December 2007 referendum. Critics say the
National Assembly wants to appear to be introducing less
radical versions of the laws to tamp down potential adverse
public reaction.
¶5. (C) Our contacts admit that the opposition will not be
able to organize itself formally to protest these impending
laws until at least October when university students return
to campus and Venezuelans are back from vacation. They add
that Chavez has a track record of passing controversial laws
during the summer months and likely judges that the initial
outcry after the laws are passed will long be forgotten by
the time of National Assembly elections scheduled for late
next year. Noted Venezuelan pollster Luis Vicente Leon told
poloffs on July 21 that there has been no public backlash
against the pending legislation because opposition media
outlets have relatively little penetration among the
populace, and therefore most Venezuelans are not aware of
what the Assembly is about to pass. He said this is why
Chavez has been cracking down on radio stations in recent
weeks; these stations have a wider reach among Venezuelans,
and Chavez must target these outlets to keep awareness low
and to better control his message.
¶6. (C) Leon's comments echoed those of other academics and
opposition party officials who note that both the penal code
and the electoral law are complicated issues that many
Venezuelans do not understand, or may dismiss as simply
another dispute in the ongoing battle between the opposition
and the Chavez government. COPEI Secretary General Alejandro
Vivas confirmed to Poloffs in mid-July that the opposition
will not be able to do much more than take note of and
monitor the laws' passage before trying to mount a more
organized opposition this fall. Nevertheless, he highlighted
the importance of challenging these laws through legal and
institutional means. He noted that even though state
institutions are effectively subservient to the executive
branch, these institutions will be around after Chavez leaves
office, and the opposition needs to be on record doing what
they can to challenge these laws through all means at their
disposal.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C) Chavez is a savvy politician skilled at calibrating
and re-calibrating his political strategy to advance
controversial legislation and achieve his policy goals.
Whether because of worsening economic conditions, the absence
of a viable political rival, or a time period of about a year
before the next scheduled elections, Chavez likely calculates
that now is the time to move forward aggressively to
implement his agenda and accelerate his revolution. The laws
currently in front of the Assembly represent some of the most
controversial legislation of Chavez's rule, but they also
form the backbone of his political ideology. In attempting
to pass these laws in short order, Chavez runs the risk of
going too far too fast, but his likely selective
implementation against a limited number of individuals and
institutions may help maintain complacency among the
Venezuelan electorate. The opposition is very worried about
the impending legislation, but they will be hard pressed to
rally more than pro forma opposition to laws that have yet to
be implemented, are difficult to comprehend, and are easily
lost among the constant din of Chavez's "revolution."
CAULFIELD