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DE RUEHC #7434 2612218
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O P 182200Z SEP 09
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TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 097434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC RS KN IR SY KZ BR CI MX
SB, AINR 
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009 REF: (A) 08 STATE 2956, (B)07 MOSCOW 5535 Classified by: ISN TFoley. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This message provides supplmentary guidance on membership and regional nonproliferation issues for the U.S. delegation to the Australia Group plenary in Paris, September 21-25, 2009.

---------- MEMBERSHIP ----------

¶2. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Russia: -- The Del may not support Russian membership in the Australia Group at this time because Russia still has not satisfied the AG's well-established criteria for membership. We continue to be concerned that Russia has not addressed AG concerns adequately, particularly those related to compliance with the CWC and BWC, a requirement relevant to membership. -- The Del may not support the idea of inviting Russia to a special AG meeting for reasons outlined in REF B; -- The Del should express continued interest in holding a technical-level outreach visit to Moscow during the intersessional period focused on eliciting information on how the Russian export control system works.

¶3. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Kazakhstan: The Del may not/not support consideration of Kazakhstan for AG membership at this time, but may support an outreach visit to Astana. The U.S. has yet to resolve outstanding compliance issues relating to Kazakhstan's initial declaration to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Inquires made by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to clarify Kazakhstan's declaration remain unanswered since 2002. The Del may note that Kazakhstan continues to make significant progress in improving its national export controls with bilateral assistance from the U.S. and other AG members, but we do not believe Kazakhstan's controls meet the standard set by the AG.

¶4. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Brazil: The Del should welcome Brazilian interest in AG membership and inform AG participants that the U.S. would look favorably upon a formal expression of interest in membership. The Del should urge AG participants to consider an outreach visit to Brasilia during the intersessional period to help entice Brazilian interest.

¶5. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Serbia: The Del may not/not support consideration of Serbia for AG membership at this time, but may support an outreach visit by neighboring AG participants to Belgrade. The U.S. has yet to resolve outstanding compliance issues related to Serbia's (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's) initial declaration to the CWC.

¶6. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Mexico: The Del may not/not support consideration of Mexico for AG membership at this time, but may support an outreach visit to Mexico City. The Del may note that Mexico recently passed CWC implementing legislation and is now beginning to draft export control legislation. If raised, the Del may agree to support an outreach visit to Mexico.

¶7. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Chile: The Del may not/not support consideration of Chile for AG membership at this time, but may support an outreach visit to Santiago. The Del should note that although Chile is only in the initial stages of drafting export control legislation, an initial outreach visit may help to catalyze interest on the part of Chilean officials.

------------------------- REGIONAL NONPROLIFERATION -------------------------

¶8. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Opening Statement: In its opening plenary statement, the Del should note in general terms the continuing problems presented by Iran, Syria and North Korea and suggest that ways to address these continuing problems should be considered.

¶9. (C//REL AUSTRALIA GROUP) Meetings on the Margins: The Del may approach the British, French, German, and Japanese delegations and AG secretariat: -- Remind delegations of the decision the Australia Group took in 2005 to exercise increased scrutiny of export license applications and AG-controlled goods bound for Syria, Iran or North Korea; -- Note the numerous Information Exchange presentations delivered at plenary sessions since 2005 suggesting that Syria, Iran and North Korea have continued to acquire goods useful to their chemical and/or biological weapons programs; -- Emphasize that failure to halt the flow of AG- controlled goods into Syria, Iran and North Korea may on day call into question the AG's relevance and important role in nonproliferation. -- Indicate that during the intersessional period the United States may suggest that AG participants should begin a conversation about what additional steps the AG could take to strengthen its posture against CBW proliferation to Syria, Iran and North Korea, including possibilities such as: - Agree to exercise, on a national basis, a 'strong presumption to deny' export license applications for some or all AG-controlled goods and technology bound for Syria, Iran and North Korea similar to the approach currently employed by the Missile Technology Control Regime; - Urge China, India and other key non-member supplier states to adopt a similar posture to what the AG adopted in 2005 ('exercise a high degree of scrutiny'); - Urge specific citation of the proliferant behavior of Syria, Iran and North Korea in an Australia Group press release. CLINTON