VZCZCXRO0629
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3077/01 2992337
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 262337Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8758
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003077

NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DENNIS BLAIR'S
MEETING WITH GENERAL GALVAN GALVAN, OCTOBER 19

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary.  DNI Dennis Blair met with Defense
Secretary General Guillermo Galvan Galvan on October 19 on
the heels of meetings with President Calderon and members of
his national security team (ref a and b).  The discussion
focused largely on the military's role in the
counternarcotics fight, with Galvan lamenting a likely
lengthy domestic mandate, the need for improved translation
of intelligence into operations, and his mistrust of other
GOM security elements.  Galvan is clearly seeking cooperation
from the USG to strengthen his institution's capacity to
fight drug trafficking organizations, but will try to keep
military actions in its own channels rather than working more
broadly with Mexico's law enforcement community.  End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) To open the discussion with General Galvan Galvan
and high-ranking members of his intel team, DNI Blair
recognized the challenges a military confronts when it has to
fight a war -- in this case against drug trafficking
organizations -- within its own country.  In response to the
DNI's question on how the GOM can make the transition away
from the armed forces to a strictly civilian counternarcotics
domestic fight, Galvan said that he does not currently see a
quick end to their internal deployment.  He indicated that
the effort is difficult for the military, in part due to the
perception that they lack the legal framework to back their
deployment.  He noted that SEDENA is working with Congress to
pass legislation that would address this matter. (Note:
Calderon submitted to Congress last session a National
Security Law that looks to codify the military's role in the
domestic CN fight. End note.)  He also mentioned that Article
29 of the constitution calling for a state of exception" in
certain areas of the country might provide them with such
legal authority (see septel for discussion on Article 29).
SEDENA runs the risk of losing public prestige and being
criticized on human rights issues as its mandate is extended,
but he nevertheless expects the military to maintain its
current role for the next 7 to 10 years.  Galvan did suggest
that increased U.S. intelligence assistance could shorten
that time frame, and also applauded USG efforts to prevent
arms trafficking across the border into Mexico.

¶3. (S/NF) Galvan indicated that he is interested in
establishing the highest levels of cooperation with the USG,
particularly in light of its "new authorities" as the
institution responsible for capturing high-value targets,
including two members of the Zetas and Sinaloa cartel head
Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera.  He further said that SEDENA
was implementing a three stage operation to specifically
target Chapo.  The first stage, which they have largely
accomplished, is to establish a physical force in the area of
his operation primarily intended to collect intelligence.  He
noted that they have found 10 to 15 locations where he moves,
but that Chapo commands the support of a large network of
informers and has security circles of up to 300 men that make
launching capture operations difficult.  The second stage is
to deploy a circle of troops into the area of his movements,
which Galvan hopes to do shortly.  The third stage is his
capture.

¶4. (S/NF) The DNI suggested that improving the intelligence
capabilities of deployed units would improve the troops'
ability to launch more rapid operations, as the USG learned
in its experience in Iraq.  Galvan said the concept is clear
-- he understands that good intelligence is worthless without
a capable reaction force.  He noted SEDENA should improve
vertical communication on intelligence matters, and said they
would be willing to accept any training the USG can offer.
Galvan complained that joint operations with law enforcement
entities are challenging because leaks of planning and
information by corrupted officials have compromised past
efforts.  Bringing police, particularly at the state and
local level, up to standard will be challenging and a
prolonged process. Galvan said that SEDENA's permanent
deployment of two officers to the El Paso Intelligence Center
will help to disseminate rapidly information to the Ciudad
Juarez commander.
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