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Viewing cable 10CAIRO255, TPT Blanket Approval for Non-technology Transfer Requests

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10CAIRO255 2010-02-28 13:01 2011-02-16 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0255/01 0591341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 281341Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0431
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000255 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS EG MARR
SUBJECT: TPT Blanket Approval for Non-technology Transfer Requests 
 
REF: SECDEF 122723; CAIRO IIR 6 899 0148 10; CAIRO IIR 6 899 0149 10 2009 CAIRO 2394; 2009 CAIRO 491 

CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador, DOS, EXO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Post continues its efforts to improve Egypt's End Use Monitoring (EUM) performance and to simplify the Third Party Transfer (TPT) request process in an effort to streamline the process and provide timely responses to the Government of Egypt (GOE). We recommend implementation of a responsive, streamlined process to address basic requests, while at the same time safeguarding U.S. interests and technology. These topics were major points of discussion during the last U.S.-Egypt bilateral Military Cooperation Conference (MCC) held in Washington, DC, in November 2009. During the MCC, the GOE agreed to designate the Egyptian Armament Authority as the single point of contact for EUM issues and to conduct continuous EUM training; and the U.S. delegation agreed to explore ways to expedite the TPT request process.

2. (C) Since the MCC, Embassy Cairo has seen a significant increase in the number of TPT requests from the Egyptian Armament Authority, which we view as a positive indication of the GOE's attempt to comply with TPT regulations. The nature and complexity of these requests varies widely from queries regarding major arms transfers to approval for routine visits or disposition of obsolete equipment. OMC anticipates the volume of these requests will only increase over time as the GOE seeks to dispose of or transfer some of the USD 40 billion worth of U.S. military equipment it has purchased over the last 30 years. The sheer volume of U.S. origin equipment in Egypt after 30+ years of FMF, coupled with Egypt's desire to develop an export arms industry, will most likely result in a continuing stream of TPT requests from GOE for the foreseeable future. We assess that an enhanced TPT clearance process that provides protection for U.S. interests, but at the same time permits expedited approval in those cases where unauthorized technology transfer is not a possibility, will reduce workload, enhance relations with allies, and encourage Egyptian cooperation and compliance.

3. (C) An example of a basic request is the recent GOE request to allow the Chief of Staff of the Turkish military to visit and tour the U.S./Egyptian M1A1 Co-production facility at Factory 200. Embassy Cairo understands that the majority of requests will require PM approval. However, Embassy Cairo would like to establish a system to quickly respond to non-controversial request as outlined in the below blanket approval. Specifically, we propose that PM grant blanket approval for certain agreed-upon, routine cases which Post would then monitor on an individual basis while keeping PM informed. These blanket approval cases would be limited to those that cannot be reasonably expected to result in a transfer of technology. Likely candidates include tours of the M1A1 Coproduction facility by representatives of countries which operate the Abrams tank, static displays or familiarization flights in U.S.-origin aircraft for representatives of countries who operate similar equipment, and tours of Egyptian Navy frigates by foreign attaches. The GOE would still be required to submit a TPT request for such activities, but Embassy Cairo would be able to give approval while simultaneously forwarding details of the request to PM. In addition, we suggest yearly OMC/PM review of approvals exercised under blanket authority in order to provide additional oversight.

4. (C) Embassy Cairo specifically requests blanket approval for the following activities: A. EGYPTIAN TANK PLANT (Factory 200):

1.Tour requests for officials of any government currently operating the M1A1.

2.Tour requests for officials of any government scheduled to receive the M1A1.

3.Tour requests for any NATO ally.

4.Tour requests for any member of the GCC+3. B. ACCESS TO U.S. ORIGIN EQUIPMENT:

1.Static displays to be viewed by officials of any NATO government.

2.Static displays to be viewed by officials of any government currently operating or scheduled to receive similar U.S. equipment.

3.Orientation flights/cruises/rides for government officials of any country currently operating the U.S. equipment in question.

5. (C) Embassy Cairo also would like to reinforce the GOE's good behavior with regards to submitting the requests by providing timely answers, even if the request is disapproved. In our view this would reinforce the emphasis we have been placing on the need for the GOE to shoulder its end use monitoring responsibilities. The following TPT requests remaining pending: 105MM Ammunition transfer to Saudi Arabia; EG Hawk Missile technical support to Turkey; EG F-16 back seat training ride for Italian AF personnel; EG request to allow Turkey to refurbish F-4 aircraft; and EG request to sell M1A1 tanks to Iraq. We appreciate PM's consideration of the blanket approval request and look forward to working with PM to effectively streamline the TPT request process. SCOBEY